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CREDIT AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN COSTA RICA 
Ceilings on the rates of interest charged on agricultural 
loans tend to have an undesirable distributional impact on farm-
ers. To benefit from subsidized credit, producers must first be-
come borrowers. Access to institutional credit, however, usually 
is restricted. A large proportion of rural producers in devel-
oping countries are excluded from institutional portfolios and, 
therefore, from the subsidy. Moreover, the amount of the free 
transfer of claims on resources is directly proportional to the 
size of the loan which, in turn, is correlated with wealth and 
influence. Similarly, when a larger borrower defaults on a loan, 
a greater wealth transfer takes place. Gonzalez-Vega's "iron law 
of interest-rate restrictions" claims that, given interest-rate 
ceilings, institutional lenders engage in rationing practices 
that redistribute loan portfolios in favor of the largest and 
least risky borrowers. Small farmers, therefore, not only re-
ceive smaller subsidies, but some are rationed out of loan port-
folios altogether. 
In the case of Costa Rica, the nationalized banking system 
and other formal lenders have been able to reach a comparatively 
large proportion (about 40 percent) of the country's farmers with 
loans. Credit portfolios, however, have been highly concentrated. 
About 10 percent of the number of borrowers have received about 
85 percent of the total amounts of agricultural credit disbursed 
and, thereby, 85 percent of the implicit subsidy. As Vogel has 
shown, the distribution of agricultural credit has been more con-
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centrated than the distribution of land ownership or of income. 
The implicit subsidy has represented up to 25 percent of value 
added in agriculture during years of higher inflation. 
Credit programs are more attractive if the funds are granted 
at a low total cost to the borrower, if funds are disbursed when 
they are needed, and if their amount is sufficient to satisfy a 
farmer's demand. Policies designed to make credit cheap, however, 
have ignored the interdependence between the rates of interest 
charged on loans and the non-interest costs of borrowing. These 
non-interest costs include explicit expenses, such as bank com-
missions and fees, taxes, legal and documentation costs, the bor-
rower's transportation, lodging, and food expenses during trips 
to the bank, bribes, and the forced purchase of other services. 
In addition, implicit costs are incurred, such as the value of 
the time spent in visits to the bank and in completing loan ap-
plication requirements. Compensatory deposits also increase loan 
costs along with the lack of timeliness and insufficient loan 
amounts. 
All mechanisms to clear the market in the presence of inter-
est-rate restrictions increase the non-interest costs of borrow-
ing. If loan amounts decline (quantity rationing), average bor-
rowing costs increase. If new fees and commissions, more strict 
requirements, or more complex procedures are used (implicit pric-
ing), transactions costs rise. Less attractive terms and condi-
tions also imply greater costs per unit of credit. Given these 
interdependencies, attempts to keep interest rates below equilib-
rium levels do not necessarily make credit cheap. 
3 
Table 1. Agricultural Borrower Costs at a Nationalized Bank 
in Costa Rica, 1983. 
Total sample 
Loan size CCR$) : 
Up to 10,000 
over 10,000 to 50,000 
over 50,000 to 100,000 
over 100,000 to 500,000 
over 500,000 
Use of the funds: 
Export crops 
Livestock 
Fruits and vegetables 
Basic grains 
Education: 
No education 
Only primary 
Up to secondary 
University 
Reads and writes 
Does not read and write 
Interest 
Rate 
13.6 
12.2 
12.5 
13.4 
15.6 
20.1 
15.6 
15.8 
12.1 
12.7 
12.8 
13.1 
14.0 
17.3 
13.6 
12.1 
Distance from branch (Km): 
Up to 1 
over 1 and up to 3 
over 3 and up to 5 
over 5 and up to 10 
over 10 and up to 20 
over 20 
Bank accounts: 
Checking: Yes 
No 
Savings: Yes 
No 
15.4 
14.0 
14.0 
13.8 
13.2 
12.3 
17.8 
12.7 
14.1 
13.4 
Non-Interest 
Borrowing Costs 
11.5 
37.1 
12.6 
4.4 
2.8 
3.4 
5.2 
7.0 
8.1 
26.0 
19.4 
15.4 
5.7 
3.7 
12.1 
23.0 
3.9 
4.0 
13.2 
12.0 
10.5 
27.1 
3.9 
13.0 
5.5 
13.4 
Total 
Costs 
25.1 
49.3 
25.1 
17.8 
18.4 
23.5 
20.8 
22.9 
20.2 
38.8 
32.2 
28.l 
19.7 
21.0 
25.7 
35.1 
19.3 
18.0 
27.3 
25.9 
23.7 
39.4 
21. 7 
25.7 
19.6 
26.8 
Source: Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Marco A. Gonzalez-Garita 
(1988}. 
4 
Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Garita measured non-interest bor-
rowing costs in Costa Rica, on the basis of a survey of 394 farm-
ers who borrowed from a nationalized bank in 1983. Many producers 
did not demand loans because transactions costs were too high. 
Hence, the major consequence of these costs: the exclusion of po-
tential borrowers from market participation cannot be observed. 
However, the observed level of non-interest costs of borrowing 
was high. It was 6.8 percent of loan size on the average. When 
loan maturity was considered, this was equivalent to 11.5 percent 
per year. Interest rates averaged 13.6 percent; thus, the total 
cost of the funds was at least 25 percent per year, as shown in 
Table 1. This high level was surprising, given the small size of 
the country, the extension of the network of bank branches and of 
roads, and the nationalization of the banking system. The bor-
rowers were literate (87 percent) and had a long banking exper-
ience (on the average over nine years). 
As a result, interest payments only represented 54 percent 
of the total cost of funds. In the case of smaller borrowers 
(with loans less than US$ 200), interest charges accounted for 
only 25 percent of total borrowing costs, while for larger bor-
rowers (with loans US$ 10,000 and over) interest costs accounted 
for 86 percent of total costs. Notable was the dispersion of the 
non-interest portion of borrowing costs. While interest rates 
ranged between 8 and 30 percent, non-interest costs ranged be-
tween 0.2 and 117.5 percent per year. The total costs of the 
funds ranged, therefore, between 10.8 and 129.5 percent per year. 
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The borrowers interviewed in the survey received loans of 
US$ 2,400 on average. These loans ranged in size between US$ 60 
and US$ 32, 000. Non-interest borrowing costs declined rapidly 
with loan size, from 37 percent per year for loans below US$ 200, 
to 2. 8 percent for loans above US$ 1, 000. This marked inverse 
relationship between borrowing costs and loan size highlights the 
regressive impact of these costs on income distribution. In view 
of this inverse relationship, a generalized increase in borrower 
transaction costs would lead to a non-uniform contraction in the 
demand for loans, with smaller borrowers deciding that the new 
total cost of the funds is too high, while the impact on larger 
borrowers would be minimal. For example, a new procedure with an 
extra cost of US$ 20, will add 10 percentage points to the cost 
of the funds in the case of a US$ 200 borrower, but only 0.2 per-
centage points in the case of a US$ 10,000 borrower. Given the 
limited access to formal credit of small farmers in developing 
countries, their exclusion from loan portfolios because of high 
transactions costs has a regressive distributional impact. 
The results also showed a significant inverse relationship 
between non-interest costs and interest rates. This confirmed 
the existence of a trade-off between the interest and non-inter-
est costs of borrowing. Underequilibrium interest rates generate 
an excess demand for credit that requires strict rationing and 
thereby increases borrowing costs. Also, preferential interest 
rates make it difficult for lenders to cover operating costs and 
risks of default. They tend to shift, therefore, some of these 
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costs over to borrowers or try to discourage marginal clients 
from applying for the subsidized loans. 
In these circumstances, raising interest rates may have a 
positive effect on income distribution. Interest payments would 
weigh more heavily in the case of larger borrowers and would dis-
courage them from demanding subsidized loans. For smaller borrow-
ers the impact would be proportionately less and probably more 
than compensated for by the decline in the non-interest costs of 
borrowing and by the increased access to loans. 
The 394 borrowers interviewed made 3,675 trips to the bank 
branches, with a total duration of 14,700 working hours. This 
represented an average of 4.5 full working days per client. On 
average, each borrower had to make 9.3 trips per loan. This re-
fl~cted the high social opportunity costs of non-price forms of 
rationing. 
High transaction costs imply that society is spending too 
many resources in operating the financial system and that, as a 
result, the cost of funds for borrowers is too high, the net re-
wards for depositors are too low, the profitability of financial 
intermediaries is unattractive, and the size of financial markets 
is too small. A large dispersion of transactions costs results 
in wide divergences among marginal rates of return across the 
economy and in unexploited opportunities for growth and improved 
resource allocation. Non-interest borrowing costs, in particu-
lar, have a significant impact on the producer's differential ac-
cess to loans and, therefore, on income and wealth distribution. 
.. 
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